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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
publication date. In the face of this, the Commissioner's determination
that the catalogs had a useful life of five years is not unreasonable.
It is respectfully submitted that the Tax Court decision in the Sheldon
case is the more realistic approach to the issue. The position of the
Tax Court should be adhered to where the advertising expenditure
results in a tangible asset, whereas that of the Circuit Court of Appeals
should be restricted in its application to cases where some intangible
asset is acquired.
RicHARa J. AsH
Statute of Frauds-The Effect of Promissory Estoppel-Plain-
tiff purchased a home next to the vacant property of the defendant.
The house was of a modern design and.of a functional nature. It was
constructed at such a place so as to take advantage of a "terrific"
view to the south and west. Before purchasing the dwelling, however,
plaintiff spoke to the defendant and they reached an oral agreement
as to the approximate location of defendant's house on the adjoining
property when constructed. The defendant assured the plaintiff that
he would not interfere with plaintiff's view by any building. After
plaintiff bought the property, defendant started to construct a house
inconsistent with the oral agreement and which would interfere with
plaintiff's-view of the country side. Plaintiff brings this suit to enjoin
the defendant from building any structure which ignores the oral
agreement as to view.' Defendant defends upon the Statute of Frauds.
Held: The defendant, his heirs, and assigns and any subsequent own-
ers of defendant's property shall be permanently prohibited from con-
structing any building which will interfere with the view from the
house of the plaintiff or his successors until the termination of the
use of the view. Miller v. Lawlor, 66 N.W. 2d. 267 (Iowa, 1953).
This case presents a somewhat unusual problem in the fact that the
interest contracted for is a nonpossessory one.2 Consequently the
usual incidents of "part performance" in the familiar sense of the
doctrine are absent. There is no contemplated entry by the grantee
into possession, nor is there any possibility of a substantial improve-
ment by the grantee of the subject lands. Either or both such circum-
I Plaintiff in an attempt to avoid the Statute of Frauds relied upon section 622.23
of the Iowa code which reads as follows: "Exception: The provisions of
subsection 3 of section 622.32 do not apply where the purchase money . . . has
been received by the vendor, or when the vendee, with the actual or implied
consent of the vendor, has taken and held possession of premises under or by
virtue of the contract, or when there is any other circumstances which, by the
law heretofore in force, would have taken the case out of the statute of
frauds." IOWA CODE (1950) I.C.A.
2 "There can be no seizin of an incorporeal hereditamnent and it can not be the
subject of entry or possession. 'It lyeth in grant, and not in livery'." The City
of Racine v. Crotsenberg, 61 Wis. 481, 21 N.W. 520 (1884) ; For a statement
on the general subject see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §8.16 (1952).
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stances have come to be recognized as typical of the normal part per-
formance situation.3
There are a wealth of cases which set forth the fundamental
rationale of the doctrine, and they are in substantial agreement that
it arises out of principles of estoppel and fraud.4 There is general
agreement, too, that the acts relied upon as part performance must be
peculiarly referable to the contract, despite the fact that such acts
need not be-and ordinarily are not---called for by the contract itself.9
The latest case to illustrate this latter point in Wisconsin was Pick
Foundry, Inc. v. General Door Manufacturing Company.6 In this
case the plaintiff signed and executed a contract which leased certain
premises to the defendant for three years. The defendant signed it
after making certain alterations in its terms and then returned it to
the plaintiff along with the first month's rent. After hearing no ob-
jections to the altered terms of the lease, and the check having been
cashed, the defendant expended $16,000 in reliance upon the contract.
Plaintiff brought an action for unlawful detainer, contending that the
agreement was void under the Statute of Frauds. The court, in finding
for the defendant, said:
"The [defendant] must show that in reliance on the con-
tract, he has proceeded either in performance or pursuance of
it, so far to alter his position as to incur an unjust and uncon-
scientious injury and loss in case the [plaintiff] is permitted
to rely upon the statutory defense. But this change of situation7
*** did not have to be acts stipulated in the contract so long as
they were done in reliance upon it." s
It is upon this requirement that the Iowa decision is most obviously
open to criticism. Granted that, as a matter of fact, plaintiff would
not have purchased the house and lot without the defendant's assur-
ance that his view would be preserved, the question remains whether
or not, in legal contemplation, the act of such purchase has that pecu-
liar referability to the oral contract as has traditionally been required
to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. Can it be said with reasonable
certainty that no person of ordinary prudence would have purchased
the house and lot in question without such assurance?
The doctrine of part performance can truly be called an anomaly9
349 AM. Ju. 422, 430, 433, 434.4See 101 A.L.R. 935, esp. footnote 33 as to cases sustaining this. Also 75 A.L.RL
650.
5 Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Schuerbrock, 195 Wis. 203, 217 N.W. 416 (1928);
Walter v. Hoffman, 267 N.Y. 365, 196 N.E. 291 (1935); Morse v. Winslow,
254 Mass. 407, 150 N.E. 158 (1926); Trout v. O'Gilvie, 41 Cal. App. 167,
182 P. 333 (1919).6 262 Wis. 311, 55 N.W2d 407 (1952).
749 Am. JUR. 737.8 Wall v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 86 Wis. 48, 56 N.W. 367 (1893).
93 AMERICA LAW OF PROPERTY §11.7.
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or a misnomer 0 and as such the trend is not to extend it" beyond
the cases of fraud or cases of settled part performance. 2 It is
generally recognized that any greater liberalization of the doctrine, so
as to include acts which are factually referable but legally unrelated,
would amount to a practical abrogation of the policy of the Statute
of Frauds.13
ROBERT E. SHARP
Insurance-Construction of "Omnibus" Provisions-On Decem-
ber 20, 1948, plaintiff was driving a truck of his employer, Omar,
Incorporated, in the course of his employment. It was one of four
vehicles, three of them Omar trucks and one of them a private auto-
mobile owned and driven by Paul Wimmer, all of them being driven
from Beloit to Milwaukee. Plaintiff's truck was second in line. All four
drivers were employees of Omar and all were in the course of their
employment.
A Midland Coach Lines bus was being driven in the opposiite
direction on the highway. After colliding with one of the Omar trucks,
the bus struck the plaintiff's truck, and plaintiff received injuries for
which he sought damages against Midland Coach Lines and Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Company, Midland's insurer. These de-
fendants interpleaded and cross-complained against the other Omar
drivers involved, Omar, Incorporated, and London Guarantee and
Accident Company, Ltd., Omar's insurer. On the basis of its contract
with Omar, and on the authority of Schneider v. Depiesl which had
just been decided, London Guarantee brought a motion for summary
judgment. The motion was denied and London Guarantee appealed.
Held: Affirmed. Shanahan v. Midland Coach Lines, 268 Wis. 233,
67 N.W. 2d 297 (1954).
The omnibus clause for the State of Wisconsin is found at Section
204.30(3), Wis. Stats. (1953), and provides:
"No such policy shall be issued or delivered in this state to the
owner of a motor vehicle, unless it contains a provision reading
substantially as follows: The indemnity provided by this policy
10 Fairall v. Arnold, 226 Iowa 977, 285 N.W. 664 (1939) ; Trebesch v. Trebesch,
130 Minn. 368, 153 N.W. 754 (1915).
1135 MmIN.L.REv. 1 (1950); 78 U.OFPA.L.REv. 51.
12 See footnote 15, 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §11.7 for list of articles sus-
taining this trend in the various jurisdictions.
1349 AM. JuR. 533; 37 MINN.L.REv. 459. In England there has been a movement
to abolish the Statute of Frauds, as pointed out in 70 LAW Q. REv. 441. How-
ever this has generally been resisted in the United States, as is pointed out in
French v. Mitchell, 92 Colo. 532, 22 P,2d 644 (1933) where Justice Bouck
writes, "Nevertheless the statute has survived these attacks; and the tendency
of modern decisions is to maintain its substantial provisions according to its
true spirit and purpose and not to indefinitely multiply exceptions thereto."
1 Schneider v. Depies, 266 Wis. 43, 62 N.W.2d 431 (1954).
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